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Italian1 teachers are allocated to schools through a centralized system on the basis of seniority.
Although the importance of teachers for student achievement is well documented (see for example
Hanushek 1992, Ehrenberg and Brewer, 1994), individual schools have no role to play in attracting
(through the oer of better pay and working conditions), selecting and retaining the best teachers.2
Such a system should pursue equality among schools { as schools may not compete in order to
have the best teachers { and among teachers { who should be fully protected against the risks
of arbitrary decisions taken by school managers. Furthermore, in a career with a very limited
pay scale, seniority rights as such might also provide a useful work incentive. Seniority provides
an opportunity for the tenured teachers who want to change their location to do so according to
their preferences. Seniority (on the lists for access to the profession) also identies the non-tenured
teachers who are awarded a yearly contract (those higher up the list also have some possibility of
choosing between various alternatives).
On the other hand such a system has its own costs. As only seniority matters, a teacher's
conduct has no impact whatsoever upon their career, including their chances to move where they
wish. Even access to a tenured position is governed by seniority, not by the teacher's actual record or
formal qualications. Matching teachers to schools according to idiosyncratic factors (i.e. a seaside
or mountain location) is not possible because teachers may only choose the school most suited to
them after a series of moves made according to increasing seniority. Consequently, only few of the
teachers currently enrolled in a given school may be truly motivated to work there. Many of them
may just be waiting to acquire the seniority level that will provide them with a better chance to
move elsewhere. More broadly, the lack of any involvement on the part of individual schools in
their sta recruitment process means that schools have no interest in cutting costs or enhancing
the quality of their personnel policy (at present they have no personnel policy at all).
Barbieri, Cipollone, and Sestito (2008) produced some initial quantitative evidence about the
stang procedures at the individual school level. More specically they constructed three sets of
measures. The rst is a measure of total turnover for each school, including both turnover due
to the annual renewal of the positions lled by non-tenured teachers hired with yearly contracts3
and the relocations of tenured teachers moving around according to a vacancy chain triggered by
retirement and their own transfer applications. The second is a mismatch indicator, counting the
percentage of the tenured teachers in each individual school who, being unsatised by their current
1 We would like to thank Piero Cipollone, Alfonso Rosolia, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the
Bank of Italy, INVALSI and VII \BRUCCHI LUCHINO" Labour Economics Workshop for their helpful comments.
2 Possibly there is some room for manoeuvre in retaining better people, at least in the case of tenured teachers
who may be informally guaranteed some advantages (in terms of timetabling for instance) to discourage them from
requesting a transfer.
3 In the next section we will describe in detail teachers' careers, emphasizing that they begin with a long phase
of short-term contracts (\supplenze brevi"), then yearly contracts and nally tenured positions are secured. For a
picture of these dierent stages see also Barbieri, Esposito and Sestito (2010).
5work environment, lled in a transfer application. The third is a revealed preference indicator,
balancing the applications to move into a given school, as expressed by the whole population of
tenured teachers, with the applications to move away from that school, as expressed by the tenured
teachers currently working there. Barbieri, Cipollone and Sestito (2008) show that these measures
are correlated with actual school performance, hinting at the possible impact of turnover (as a proxy
for organizational turmoil) and teachers' motivation on school eectiveness. Cipollone, Montanaro
and Sestito (2010) further show that teacher turnover is related to some measures of students'
learning over time.
In this paper we put forward this analysis by better documenting the drivers of teacher mobility
in the centralized system depicted above. To a large extent such an analysis is preliminary to any
identication of the causal links between teacher mobility and school eectiveness. Indeed, in
order to identify those links one needs to understand the determinants of teacher mobility so as to
exploit its features which are exogenous with respect to the relationship between teacher mobility
and school eectiveness.
Most of the previous research on teacher mobility and turnover has focused on the factors
determining the decision to leave the public school system (Murnane and Olsen 1990, Dolton 1990,
Dolton and van der Klaauw 1995, Stinebrickner 2002, Bonesronning et al. 2003, Hanushek et al.
2004; for Italy see Barbieri, Esposito and Sestito 2010). By contrast, there is still little research
on the important issue of mobility within the public school system (see or example Falch and
Strom 2005, and Bradley et al. 2006), which, at least in the Italian case, is empirically much more
important. Furthermore, unlike previous research focusing on actual worker mobility, we focus on
desired mobility, and specically on transfer applications by tenured teachers. These applications
by denition reect teachers' preferences in favour of another school, regardless of the presence
of vacancies in that school, which then determines if the transfer will actually take place. We
interpret the fact of ling an application to move to another school as a sign of dissatisfaction with
the current school and we analyse the drivers of this dissatisfaction.
Looking at desired mobility provides an interesting test case as, dierently from other labour
market segments where only the complex interplay of employers' and employees' decisions are
observed, we can focus upon workers' mobility choices. In order to do this, we restrict our attention
to tenured teachers, who only move if they so desire. Notice however that transfers of tenured
teachers is only part of the overall turnover, as non-tenured teachers, including those with yearly
contracts, on the contrary move from one school to another depending upon the availability of
vacant positions. While most of our analysis will be concerned with the mobility aspirations of
tenured teachers only { as we will look at the determinants of the probability of a tenured teaching
submitting a transfer application when he/she is entitled but not obliged to do so { we start by
looking at the overall mobility patterns of both tenured and non-tenured teachers with yearly
contracts.
6More specically, we will identify the two main drivers of teacher mobility, namely broad ge-
ographical context and factors related to school characteristics. The former is a very important,
although little-explored, aspect of teacher mobility (for some exceptions see Boyd et al. 2005a,
and Boyd et al. 2005b). Geographical preferences are in general quite idiosyncratic, being related
to unobserved individual preferences. Empirically we proxy them by the individuals' birth-place.
Because of the very long entry queues to join the teaching profession in Italy, teachers have to
accept whichever location is oered to them and very often start their careers far from their desired
geographical location. As a result, we can identify the role of such a magnet by looking at teachers'
actual and desired moves towards their birth place as they acquire more seniority. However, the
driver we are more interested in refers to those school characteristics { within a broad geographical
location { which may signal that a school is an easier place to work. Thanks to the data available
to us, we focus here on characteristics of individual schools and their social context rather than on
those of the wider local school districts (explored by some previous US research focusing on working
conditions, see for example Hanushek et al. 2004). In the context of education, a school that is
easier to work in may mean a school where teaching is less demanding but possibly less important,
as students do not need any extra support. Our ndings about this mobility driver show that
teachers are driven away from the most dicult schools, which so end up being populated by inex-
perienced and un-motivated teachers. This obviously aects the ecacy of the education system
as a whole. Dissatised teachers may be poor performers not only because of general motivational
factors (Rocko 2004, Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain 2005), but also because they are simply waiting
to move on to a dierent location, putting low eort into their current work duties and disregarding
any longer term plans for their students. This is possible in Italy where career advancement (and
future mobility opportunities) are not subject to any scrutiny or monitoring.
It should be noted that our work, while motivated by the importance of mobility and workers'
motivation in the education sector, has some broader relevance for the analysis of internal labour
markets in the public sector. Indeed, many other public sector activities and agencies share a similar
central allocation mechanism in which workers are allowed to move between dierent locations
according to seniority, while increases in salary and monitoring of employees are rather limited.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the rules governing
teachers' careers and mobility in Italy. Section 3 presents the data and the broad mobility and
turnover patterns. As we will focus on the geographical drivers of mobility, in Section 4 we present
the picture of the evolution of the geographical distance between the current work-place and the
birth-place (as a proxy of the desired geographical location) for both tenured and non-tenured
teachers in the course of their working careers. Then, Section 5 presents an analysis of tenured
teachers' transfer applications. Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions.
72 The employment system for teachers in Italy
In Italy there are three broad categories of teachers: tenured teachers, who may be red only under
very special circumstances;4 temporary teachers with yearly contracts and who may or may nor nd
a new assignment the subsequent year (such an assignment generally being in a dierent school);5
and short-term replacement teachers, with contracts covering a short period or periods during the
year. The archives we are going to exploit are restricted to the former two groups, as the short
contracts for the latter group are arranged directly at the school level.6
In principle (see the law introduced in 1999), access to tenured positions ought to take place
through competitive examinations. In practice, these competitions are rarely held as there are
special provincial lists of \qualied" individuals in order of seniority and dierentiated by subject,
waiting to be assigned a position. Being \qualied" has meant dierent things at dierent times:
for most of the period covered by this paper, it has meant having a suitable degree and either having
done a relevant postgraduate course or having accumulated some teaching experience through short
teaching assignments. In reality, following some legislative or administrative decisions that widened
access to the lists, some teachers who had qualied in the past were able to participate in a seniority
mechanism which allocates both newly-established tenured positions and yearly contracts. In this
way, teachers who had been put on the list in the distant past were now included in the new lists,
which was an advantage because even being bottom of the list was considered an achievement.
Since 2007, the existing provincial lists have been frozen, so that no new additions to the lists (and
into the profession) are possible anymore, unless a list (in a given province and for a given subject)
becomes vacant.
For our purposes here, it is worth noticing that both the chance of a tenured position and that
of a yearly assignment depend on seniority alone as no other competitive selection takes place.
A teacher who performs poorly in the school where she has been allocated is not punished at
all (unless in extreme cases of misconduct, as previously mentioned). Teachers obtain a tenured
position after several years of yearly assignments, which may have been discontinuous and often
unrelated to each other. On average teachers are 40 years old when they obtain a tenured position,
having accumulated a sucient number of years of seniority.
Seniority still dominates after obtaining a tenured position. The salary depends almost exclu-
4 These very special circumstances refer to disciplinary infringements, but it should be noted that even extreme
misconduct is rarely sanctioned. Tenured teachers whose positions are going to be discontinued have in any case the
right to a similar position elsewhere. In fact, we exclude them from most of our analysis because they are obliged to
submit an application to move to another school and so it would not make sense to look at the probability of such
an event.
5 More precisely there are two dierent types of yearly contracts (for further details see Barbieri, Cipollone and
Sestito 2008) and we consider them both.
6 Some more information about people with short (\infrayearly") assignments is in Barbieri, Esposito and Sestito
(2010), who show that this kind of job assignment often constitutes the rst step in a teacher's career. Since it is
therefore an entry port to a teaching career, this phase is also characterized by many exits from the profession.
8sively on length of service, not on work performance. Pay rises are automatically awarded after
2, 8, 14, 20, 27 and 34 years of service, cumulating the years before and after obtaining tenure.
Albeit automatic, these pay rises are rather limited. The overall increases for primary, lower and
upper secondary school teachers are respectively 47, 50 and 57 percent of the starting salary against
average gures of 71, 71 and 72 percent according to OECD tables.
However, there is a second and possibly more important aspect that is aected by seniority:
the chance to move to the most desired school and location. As a general rule, tenured teachers
may apply for their most desired school and are top of the list whenever a vacancy arises. Among
tenured teachers, the teacher with the highest seniority is selected. The vacancy chain mechanism
works as follows. New vacancies are created, mostly following the retirement of the most senior
teachers. They are then lled by already tenured teachers who indicated their interest in those
vacancies the previous Spring. Then it is the turn of newly tenured teachers to be allocated (with
no possibility to formally express any preference). Finally, the slots left out and, more importantly,
those vacated by tenured teachers moving to other schools7 are then lled by temporary yearly
assignments around the start of the school year. Overall, the mechanism never stops because,
overall, there are more job positions than tenured teachers, the tenured positions being rationed
due to budgetary considerations.
Our focus is on the transfer applications led by tenured teachers, interpreting them as a sign of
dissatisfaction with the school where they are currently working. Tenured teachers have the right
to try to transfer to a school they prefer in terms of its broad geographical location, a particular
area within a province, a particular town or particular school. However, we need to consider that
not all applications are spontaneous because newly tenured teachers need to apply even if they are
simply requesting to stay in the school where they have just been assigned. In principle, we could
group together those teachers requesting to remain in their current school with those who are not
applying to transfer, but we prefer to exclude the just tenured people from most of the analysis, as
the process of ling a transfer application is clearly dierent in the two cases. For similar reasons
we also exclude those few teachers made redundant from their current school (\extra" teachers) and
who are obliged to apply as they cannot stay on. Another particular group comprises teachers in
their second year of tenure. Although they may choose whether to apply for a transfer or not, their
choice set is more limited as they can only apply for schools within the same province. Therefore
transfer applications made by these teachers may also be interpreted as a signal of dissatisfaction
with their current school, but dier from the general case. For these reasons most of our analysis
will be limited to voluntary transfer requests only, on the part of teachers with at least two years
of tenure and who have not been made redundant from their current school.
7 On top of this, there are also some positions vacant if a tenured teacher is going to be on leave for the whole
school year.
93 Data and variables
3.1 The data
The data used in this paper comes from the combination of dierent administrative registries of
Italian schools and teachers maintained by the Italian Ministry of Education, and data from the
2001 Italian population and housing census. The rst registry is the teacher database, which
contains records of teachers with information on gender and date of birth, municipality of birth,
type of contract (yearly temporary assignments or full tenure), seniority if a tenured position is
held, a unique anonymized teacher identier, and a unique anonymized identier of the school
where the teacher works. Unfortunately, there is no information about the family situation of the
teachers or their educational background nor is there any data available on teachers with infrayearly
assignments (for this category, see Barbieri, Esposito and Sestito, 2010).
Through the anonymized teacher identier we were able to link the teacher database to the
registry for teachers' transfer applications. For each tenured teacher who les a transfer application,
this registry records the preferences given to new destinations. Specically, transfer applications can
be submitted during the school year (in February) and tenured teachers in primary and secondary
schools can indicate up to 15 and 20 new preferred destinations respectively. These registries
completely cover the school years 2005/2006, 2006/2007, and 2007/2008.
Through the anonymized school identier we were able to link the teacher registries to school
registries. These school registries contain records of school type, municipality and postal address,
the number of enrolled students, the number of foreign-born students, the number of disabled
students, the number of students who drop out of the school system during the school year,8 the
number of students who, at the end of the school year, have been tested for the access to the next
grade, and the number of students who have actually moved up to the next grade.
These administrative data allows us to obtain very detailed information about Italian teachers
and schools. Furthermore, administrative data does not present problems which are typical of sur-
vey data, such as unit and item non-response, measurement errors and bias eects due to interaction
with interviewers. Relative to normal survey data however, they contain very little information on
socio-economic characteristics of the teachers and on their family situation. Furthermore, complete
data on all registries are only available for the school years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007.
Using the detailed school address, we were able to link the school registries to data from the 2001
Italian population and housing census, which gave us the possibility to gain some information about
the socio-economic context where the school is located. Census data contains information about
the gender and age composition of the resident population, educational qualications, the labour
market (such as occupational status and type of occupation), and housing (such as household
composition, characteristics of buildings and dwellings). Census data collection is organized by
8 This excludes students who have moved to another school during the year.
10dividing Italy into territorial units called census divisions. We construct a hypothetical market for
each individual school by associating to it the closest census divisions. It should be noted that
any one individual census section may be associated to more than one school (even at the same
grade) since we consider all the closest divisions whose relevant population, in terms of age, sum
up to a multiple of the students actually enrolled in a given school. The method, better described
in Appendix A, thus provides a complete picture of the potential enrollment competition between
schools and allows us to identify whether a given census section is potentially served by competing
schools.
We focus our analysis on all registered native teachers9 born between 1940 and 1980 (aged 25 to
65 in 2005), teaching in primary, lower-secondary (\Secondaria di I grado") and upper-secondary
(\Secondaria di II grado") schools during the school years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007. For simplicity,
from now on we will refer to school year 2005/2006 as year 2005, to school year 2006/2007 as year
2006, and so on. Our nal sample consists of 719,692 teachers working in 17,815 schools.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of teachers by year of birth, gender and type of school. It is
important to note that almost all primary school teachers are female, female teachers also predom-
inate in lower-secondary schools, and female teachers are younger than their male colleagues in all
types of school.
3.2 Teacher-level variables
Our main measure is an indicator for a teacher submitting a transfer application. As pointed out in
Section 2, only tenured teachers can submit transfer applications. This measure will be our response
variable in Section 5. Distance from the birth place is our main measure related to geographical
mobility. Note that considering residential location at birth avoids problems of endogeneity we
would instead face if we used teachers' current residential location. Distance is computed as the
geodetic distance10 between the municipality where the teachers were born and the municipality
where they currently work.11 In addition to distance, we include an indicator for teachers who were
born in the same province where they now work.
We control for a set of teacher characteristics. This set includes age, an indicator for female
teachers, the seniority of tenured teachers (number of years of tenure), indicators for the geographic
area of birth, and indicators for the size of the municipality where teachers were born. Appendix B
9 There are very few foreign-born teachers. They are not included because considering the proximity of their birth
place to their work place would not be very meaningful. In any case, we do not observe any systematic dierences in
the distribution of native and foreign-born teachers by geographical area of work.
10 Geodetic distance is the length of the shortest curve between two points along the surface of the earth. Geodetic
distance behaves well for wide areas of coverage, and takes the earth's curvature into account.
11 We were able to identify the municipality where teachers were born and where the schools are located, but
not the exact location within the municipality. Assigning exactly the same geographic localization (latitude and
longitude) to dierent places within the same municipality is a source of approximation error. Nevertheless, we are
condent that the consequences of such an approximation on our results are negligible.
11provides a description of these teacher-level variables.
3.3 School-level variables
We also control for a set of school characteristics and features and a set of socio-economic variables
of the catchment area of a particular school. The former set includes both characteristics obtained
directly from the school registries and other characteristics computed (using the school identier)
through a summary of the characteristics of teachers working in each school. From the schools
registries regarding teachers, we compute the total number of teachers in each school (as a proxy
for school size), the share of non-tenured teachers, and the relative share of tenured teachers aged
under 40, from 41 to 50, and over 60 years. Potentially these variables may impact the decision
to stay on in the current school as they may lead to job changes within the current school. As for
the school registries, we construct indicators for type of school, geographic area where the school
is located, size of the municipality where the school is located,12 schools located in a municipality
more than 600 metres above sea level, schools expanding the number of enrolled students year
on year, and the types of students in the school. All these variables may proxy for the prestige
and accessibility of a school (particularly in the case of a commuting teacher). On top of this,
we include the school's share of disabled students, foreign-born students,13 students who drop out
of the school system, and students failing to gain access to the next grade.14 These variables are
used as proxies for the students' socio-economic background and educational ability, which are
not directly observable from the data. Hence, such variables should allow us to identify the most
dicult schools in terms of teaching. Because most of the foreign-born students are immigrants
from poor countries, a high proportion of foreign-born students can be taken as an indicator of low
economic background and teaching diculties. We are aware that a high share of students failing
to gain access to the next grade cannot be unambiguously related to low average ability of students
in a particular school. Besides the fact that students' ability is not the sole factor impinging upon
exams' results (actually teachers' quality and motivation matter and this is why one is interested
into them), exams' results are not much comparable across schools in Italy because of the lack of
a centralized score system. This may impart some biases to the expected positive relation between
the two as we expect teachers to leave schools with least able and most dicult to teach students.
For the same reason a positive coecient, but for possible statistical biases, is also expected for the
share of students who drop out of the school system.
We attributed a similar role to the socio-economic census variables associated to the school's
12 Because we found the exact location of schools from their addresses, we were also able to distinguish between
schools located in the centre or in the suburbs of a large municipality.
13 Foreign-born students include either students born outside Italy or students whose parents were born outside
Italy.
14 This is obtained as the number of failing students over tested students. The latter do not coincide with total
enrolled students because of drop-out students and net transfers from/to other schools.
12catchment area. We include the share of illiterate residents, the occupation rate, the share of people
occupied in agriculture, the average number of rooms per household (standardized by household
composition and municipality size), and the average number of household members. These indi-
cators provide a description of the socio-economic context of the school. They may reect both
the potential living conditions for teachers working in a particular school and living close to it,
and the socio-economic background of the students enrolled in that school. On the basis of the
robustness of our results to the inclusion of detailed geographical controls for each travel-to-area,
we strongly favour the second interpretation. Hence, both these indicators and the students' com-
position indicators will be employed in order to identify the schools where teaching is most dicult
(but possibly more important!). Appendix C provides a description of all the school-level variables.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
About 16% of teachers included in our starting sample15 are non-tenured. Teachers who have been
tenured for no more than two years account for about 4%, while 1% are teachers made redundant
from their current school. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on teachers. The rst two numerical
columns show descriptive statistics for all the teachers included in our dataset.16 The average
distance from their place of birth is 120 kilometres, and only about 33% of teachers do not work
in their province of birth. The average age is about 47 and slightly less than 80% of teachers are
female. The majority of teachers are born in the South of Italy.
The last two numerical columns show descriptive statistics for our nal sample made of teachers
tenured for at least two years and who have not been made redundant. About 12% of these teachers
apply for a transfer. On average, teachers have been tenured for about 18 years, they work closer
to their birth place and are older than the overall population of teachers (including the non-tenured
teachers with yearly assignments, the newly-tenured teachers and the redundant teachers).
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on schools. Primary schools account for about 33% of all
schools. The average number of teachers working in a school is 40. The (unweighted) average share
of non-tenured teachers is 20%. The average proportion of tenured teachers aged 40 or less is 15%.
Table 3 shows the sample proportions of \dicult" schools by geographical area and school type.
Most of the schools with a high share of foreign-born students are located in the North or Centre of
Italy. On the other hand, schools with a higher share of students dropping-out are mainly located
in the South.
Finally, Table 4 is a correlation matrix showing links between students' composition variables
and social context variables, based on census information. Unsurprisingly, there is a positive
correlation between the share of students who drop out of the school system and that of students
15 The starting sample excludes only foreign-born teachers and those observations with missing information.
16 The proportion of teachers submitting a transfer application and average tenure are not reported for the full
sample, which includes also non-tenured teachers.
13failing to gain access to the next. Furthermore, there is a high positive correlation between the
share of illiterate residents, that of people employed in agriculture, and the average number of
household members. These variables are instead negatively correlated with the employment rate.
4 The geographical driver
The distance between teachers' place of birth and place of work is one of the main driving forces for
teacher mobility. Boyd et al. (2005a and 2005b) show that US teachers express preferences to teach
close to where they grew up and, controlling for proximity, they prefer areas with characteristics
similar to their hometown. In this section we look at the overall mobility patterns (of both tenured
and non-tenured teachers, i.e. our starting sample as depicted in the left most columns of Table 1)
and its relationship with the geographical driver of mobility, an aspect upon which even non-tenured
teachers have some room for manoeuvre.
Figure 2 shows the average distance of all teachers in our dataset by age. 25-year-old teachers
work on average 300 kilometres away from their place of birth. Average distance decreases until the
age of 40. Then, for teachers aged 40 to 65 distance is around 100 km. This picture is consistent
with the hypothesis that distance from the birth-place is an important driver for teacher mobility.
In fact, although possibly starting their career far away from the municipality where they are born,
teachers seem to gradually get closer to their place of birth as age increases.
Specically, in Italy this pattern is almost entirely explained by the choices made by teachers
born in the South, who constitute the majority of all Italian teachers. Figure 3 shows the average
distance by age and teachers' area of birth. Teachers born in the North or Centre of Italy work on
average about 50 kilometres away from their home town. Dierences by age are negligible. The
prole of teachers born in the South is completely dierent. In fact, for the latter the distance is
on average higher than 400 kilometres until the age of 30. The average distance sharply decreases
between the ages of 30 and 40. Then, after the age of 40 the distance is around 150 kilometres.
Hence, teachers born in the North or Centre of Italy work on average close to their birth-places.
On the other hand, many teachers born in the South of Italy start their career in a school located
in the Centre or North. Among the reasons for this there is a higher probability of nding a job
further north. Then, over the years as their seniority increases they get closer to their home towns.
Nevertheless, some remain far from their place of birth until the very end of their career. Beyond
an age threshold no many further geographically related moves take place.
This is conrmed by Figure 4, which shows the percentage composition of teachers by age and
area of birth distinguished by the geographical location of the school. In the schools of the country
as a whole, we observe a high prevalence of teachers born in the South. In the Southern schools we
nd only a few teachers from the other two areas at any age. In the schools located in the North of
Italy about 50% of the teachers aged 25 come from the South. Such a percentage gradually reduces
14down to 20% for 40-year-old teachers. A similar, although less strong, pattern is observed in the
schools located in the Centre of Italy. This evidently conrms the fact that many teachers born in
the South of Italy start their career in a school located in the Centre or the North. Then, many {
but not all { of them move closer to their place of birth.
One of the reasons why teachers born in the South starts their careers in the North is in order to
shorten the time needed to obtain tenure. Table 5 shows the average age of teachers who obtained
tenure in 2006 by school area and teachers' area of birth. On average,teachers working in a school
located in the North become tenured teachers when they are about 39 years old. For teachers
working in a school in the South the average age is slightly more than 40. Nonetheless, teachers
born in the South who work in a school located in the North become full tenured teachers before
they are 39. Hence, for teachers born in the South there seems to be a trade-o between distance
and the time needed to obtain full tenure.
Important dierences in average distance are also observed by gender and type of contract.
Figure 5 shows the average distance by age and gender. From the age of 30, male teachers work on
average farther from their home towns than female teachers. Figure 6 shows the average distance
by age and type of contract. We distinguish teachers with a temporary contract, newly-tenured
teachers and teachers who have been tenured for at least two years. Not surprisingly, tenured
teachers work closer to their birth-place at any age. Furthermore, teachers with temporary contracts
work on average much farther from their birth-place than newly-tenured teachers until the age of 45.
We also exploited the longitudinal nature of our data with an econometric exercise17 in which we
analysed the change in distance faced by teachers between any two consecutive years. Specically,
we observe important dierences related to the change in teachers' status. Newly-tenured teachers
(i.e. teachers non-tenured the rst year we observe and tenured the second year under observation)
show on average an increase in distance, indicating that in order to get full tenure they are ready
to pay the price of working farthest from their place of birth. On the other hand, teachers who had
been tenured for at least two years show on average a strongly negative change in distance.
5 Schools' characteristics and teachers' transfer applications
Our aim is to identify the role of schools' characteristics { in triggering the decision to move away
by teachers, namely those directly related to student composition and those that possibly stem
from the socio-economic context of the area where the school is located. We expect teachers to try
to leave dicult schools. For our research, we need to control for the proximity to the birth-place
as a mobility driver as well as other possible drivers related to the school itself and the individual
teacher. So we undertake an econometric exercise.
Our exercise is not the rst in the international literature. Although salaries play a role in
17 Results are available from the authors upon request.
15location decisions (Murnane and Olsen 1990, Dolton and van der Klaauw 1999, Figlio 2002, and
Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2004), several empirical studies have shown that teachers' preferences
are highly inuenced by non-pecuniary factors such as student characteristics. For example, using
data about Queensland state school teachers, Bradley et al. (2006) nd that (after controlling
for pecuniary factors such as remuneration) non-pecuniary factors, such as class size and location,
aect movement decisions. Investigating the factors that aect the probabilities that teachers
switch or exit state schools, Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) show that teacher mobility is much
more strongly related to the characteristics of the students, particularly race and achievement, than
to salary. Using data for the San Diego school system, Greenberg and McCall (1974) show that
internal mobility of teachers is governed by non-pecuniary dierences as student socio-economic
status. Prost (2006) shows that teachers of French tend to switch when they work in schools with
a high share of less able students, of students from minorities and of students from an economically
disadvantaged background.
To our knowledge our exercise is the rst for Italy and is quite unique in the international
panorama for its widespread coverage (we consider all schools and teachers) and for its very detailed
nature. Moreover, it is quite unique in that we analyse teachers' transfer applications. Because
we are interested here in voluntary transfer applications, we focus only on teachers for whom
submitting an application is a free and unconstrained choice, i.e. teachers who have been tenured
for at least two years and have not been made redundant from the school.
Figure 7 shows the share of teachers submitting a transfer application by age and area of birth.
This proportion decreases for the age group 30-55 years, and is close to zero for the group aged 55
years and over. Furthermore, we observe a clear ordering of the share by teachers' area of birth.
At any age, teachers born in the South are more likely to apply for a transfer than teachers born
in the Centre, and the latter are more likely to want to move than teachers born in the North.
However, the chances of applying for a transfer is far from negligible even for the latter.
We model here teachers' preferences about staying in their current school versus applying for a
transfer to another school. Specically, we employ a probit model for the probability that the i-th
teacher submits a transfer application (Ai = 1) as a function of a set of individual characteristics
Zi and a set of characteristics of the school j where teacher i works Qji
18
Pr(Ai = 1jZi;Qji) = ( + Zi + Qji);
where ,  and  are unknown parameters and  is the standard normal distribution function.
Individual characteristics Zi include a third-degree polynomial in the distance between teachers'
birth-place and work-place, an indicator for teachers born in the same province where they work,
18 We also estimated a zero-truncated negative binomial model for the number of preferences given by teachers
who apply for a transfer as a function of the characteristics of teachers' and of the actual school. Results substantially
conrm the main ndings of the model for the probability of making an application.
16a second-degree polynomial in years of tenure, a second-degree polynomial in age,19 an indicator
for female teachers, indicators for the geographic area of birth, and for the size of the municipality
where teachers were born. The set of characteristics of the school where teachers work Qji includes
indicators for type of school, the geographic area where the school is located, the size of the
municipality where the school is located, location of the school in a municipality 600 meters or
more above sea level, the total number of teachers in the school, the share of non-tenured teachers,
the share of tenured teachers aged under 40, from 41 to 50, and over 60, and schools expanding the
number of enrolled students. Furthermore, Qji also includes the school's share of disabled students,
foreign-born students, drop-out students, students failing to gain access to the next grade, and,
in the socio-economic context of the school catchment area, the share of illiterate residents, the
employment rate, the share of people employed in agriculture, the number of rooms per household,
and the average number of household members. Finally, we include year xed-eects.
Table 6 shows the maximum likelihood estimation of the probit model for the probability of
submitting a transfer application. Standard errors are corrected for within-school clustering. Dif-
ferent specications of the model are presented. The rst specication (Model 1) includes teachers'
characteristics only, the second specication (Model 2) extends Model 1 by including schools' char-
acteristics, the third specication (Model 3) extends Model 2 by including student composition
variables, and nally the last specication (Model 4) extends Model 3 by including social context
variables. From now on our comments refer to the last specication (Model 4) which includes all
sets of covariates.20 Most of the coecients have the expected sign. Both age and years of tenure
are negatively related to the probability of applying. Conrming the description provided in the
previous section, the coecients of the polynomial in distance are statistically highly signicant.
Not working in the province of birth increases the probability of applying to move. Female teachers
are less likely to apply for a transfer than male ones. Teachers born in larger municipalities are
more prone to move. Figure 8 shows the predicted probability of submitting a transfer application
for the baseline teacher as a function of distance (Panel 1), tenure (Panel 2) and age (Panel 3). The
rst panel of the gure indicates a positive relation between distance from the birth-place and the
probability of submitting a transfer application.21 The second panel indicates a decreasing relation
between years of tenure and the probability of making an application. Finally, the third panel of
Figure 8 shows that, after controlling for distance and tenure, there is a at relation between age
and the probability of applying for a transfer between the ages of 30 and 40 years. Nonetheless,
there are a few tenured teachers aged under 40 applying to transfer. From the age of 40 this
probability starts to decrease until the age of 65.
The mismatch vis-a-vis birth place is not the only mobility driver as school characteristics and
features are also strongly related to teachers' transfer applications. First of all, there is a clear
19 Coecients on higher degree polynomials are not statistically signicant.
20 From likelihood-ratio tests { the four models are nested { Model 4 is preferred over all other specications.
21 There are few tenured teachers working more than 300 kilometres away from home.
17dierence by type of school. Other things being equal, relative to lower-secondary schools (the
reference category of this model) teachers working in primary schools or upper-secondary schools
are less likely to apply. In particular, among upper-secondary schools, teachers working in classical-
stream or scientic-stream upper-secondary are less prone to mobility. Teachers working in large
schools have a lower probability of applying to transfer.
Furthermore, we observe a strong positive relation between the probability of submitting a
transfer application and the share of disabled students and foreign-born students. On the other
hand, after controlling for other school characteristics, a high share of students who drop out of
the school system or failing to gain access to the next grade are not signicantly related to the
probability of a transfer application.
Finally, there is also a clear relation between the probability of making a transfer application
and the socio-economic context of the school where teachers actually work. Specically, there is a
signicant positive relation between the probability of submitting a transfer application and illit-
eracy rate, the fraction of employed in agriculture and the average number of household members.
Such a probability is also negatively related to the employment rate in the school catchment area.
All in all, both these variables (student composition and socio-economic status of the surrounding
catchment area) conrm that teachers are more likely to try to leave the most dicult schools.
These results are essentially conrmed when the model is estimated separately for primary,
lower-secondary and upper-secondary schools. Table 7 shows the maximum likelihood estimation
of the probit model for the probability of submitting a transfer application by school type. Only
coecients of student variables and socio-economic context variables are reported. A high share
of foreign-born students in the school is a strong deterrent to remaining in all types of schools.
Teachers in lower-secondary and upper-secondary schools with a high share of disabled students
have a higher probability of submitting a transfer application. This does not seem to be true for
teachers working in primary schools, where the eect of the share of disabled students is statistically
not signicant.
A rst source of concern in relation to our results may be the presence of measurement error,
particularly in some of the student composition variables. As everyone knows, students tests and
exams are not centralized in Italy and the pass rate (and more generally the marks) may be not very
comparable across schools as a measure of students' ability. As a general rule, measurement error
should lead to an attenuation bias. Such a bias might be the reason behind the lack of the expected
positive link between the share of drop-outs and of students failing to gain access to the next grade
and the probability of submitting a transfer application. On the other hand, given that we are using
current outcomes concerning students of a given school and not measures of their ability when they
rst enrolled at that school, our measures might suer from a potential endogeneity bias pushing
in the other direction. The source of this endogeneity bias is actually behind our interest in the
determinants of teachers' desired mobility, i.e. the possibility that dissatised and ready-to-move
18teachers have a negative impact upon their students' performance (see also Cipollone, Montanaro
and Sestito 2010).
As a robustness check we considered an alternative specication in which the quality of the
student pool is captured by the share of students enrolled in the rst year in a school having
had to repeat one or more years' of study in their previous school career, instead of the share of
drop-out and failing students. The added variable is strongly correlated with the share of drop-
outs and failing students { the correlation of the added variable with the regressors used so far is,
respectively, 0.272 and 0.467 in lower-secondary schools, and 0.385 and 0.319 in upper-secondary
schools, while no such variable can be dened for primary schools, which we therefore excluded
from the robustness exercise. Therefore, by denition, the added variable is unaected by current
teachers' behaviour and the precise actual implementation of exams standards at the individual
school level and does not suer from either the endogeneity or the measurement error problems
discussed earlier. Given that we have only one single variable we cannot implement a proper IV
strategy, and we experimented with a specication which may be considered as a reduced form,
in which the new variable replaces the share of failing students and drop-outs. Table 8 shows
the maximum likelihood estimation of such a specication. The model is estimated separately for
teachers working in dierent types of schools. The probability of submitting a transfer application
is positively related to the share of newly enrolled students who have previously repeated a year.
This positive relation is not signicant for lower-secondary schools because not many students have
accumulated many repeated years, but it is highly signicant for upper-secondary schools.
A second source of concern relates to the fact that we have so far interpreted the role of socio-
economic context variables as a proxy for schools' teaching conditions more than as a proxy for the
living conditions of a locally-housed teacher. One could however easily argue that living conditions
are what matter and that what these variables are capturing is the unwillingness of teachers to live
in less pleasant locations. In order to shed further light upon this issue, we therefore estimated a
model with a full set of xed eects for the local living area where a teacher working in a given
school is supposed to reside. Such an area is wider that the area immediately in reach of the school,
as we take into account the possibility of commuting within a broader travel-to-work area. So we
may still identify the eect of the schools' socio-economic context variables within any local travel-
to-work area, an eect now unambiguously interpretable in terms of the teaching conditions of the
school. More specically, we identied the residential area where the teacher has to live by focusing
upon the 600 Local Labour Systems (LLSs) constructed by ISTAT on the basis of the 2001 census.22
So the LLS xed eects (here unreported) should capture the impact of the living conditions, while
the remaining impact of the socio-economic context variables of each school (now identied within
each travel-to-work area) should only be related to the teaching conditions in the individual school.
22 An LLS is the array of local municipalities within which most of the daily home-to-work commuting takes place.
By denition people living in an LLS usually also work within its bounds.
19For computational ease we conduct this experiment using a linear probability model (LPM) and
Table 9 shows the estimated coecients of an LPM with and without the SLL xed eects. The
model is estimated for teachers working in all types of schools and separately for teachers working
in primary, lower-secondary and upper-secondary schools. The intra-class correlation coecient,
i.e. the percentage of error variance due to unobserved heterogeneity,ranges from about 2.6% for
primary schools to about 6.3% for lower-secondary schools, and the hypothesis that these xed
eects are equal to zero is rejected in all cases. Including xed eects at the LLS level however
substantially conrms our previous ndings. Specically, the probability of submitting a transfer
application is higher for teachers working in schools with a high proportion of disabled students,
foreign students, drop-out students, and students failing to gain access to the next grade, as well
as in schools located in a context with high illiteracy and low occupation rates.
Finally, in Appendix D we present additional robustness checks estimating a model which allows
for school-specic unobserved heterogeneity23 and separately by gender, teachers' area of birth and
school area. Again, estimation of these models substantially conrms our previous ndings.
6 Conclusions
In the Italian system teachers are allocated according to a seniority based centralized system with
no active role played by the individual schools in attracting, selecting and retaining teachers. Also
because of the rather limited pay scales, the fact that the more senior teachers can select their
most preferred school and geographical location represents one of the main opportunities Italian
teachers have. Our paper has examined the main drivers of the resulting voluntary mobility of
Italian teachers.
Specically, we focused upon two drivers of teacher mobility. Firstly geographical distance from
the birth-place since teachers may start their careers far from their desired location (usually the
place they were born) and then work towards returning there. Secondly, the characteristics of the
schools involved, which relate to a vast array of structural characteristics within a school, possibly
signalling that it is a dicult place to work. In the educational context this means a school where
teaching is more demanding but possibly more important, as students would need extra support
from their school and their teachers. This is a problem for the education system as teachers will
be driven away from the most dicult schools, which will be lled by less experienced and less
motivated teachers. Even tenured and therefore more experienced teachers working there may just
be waiting to move on to a dierent location, putting only a small amount of eort into their
current work duties.
We nd a sizable impact of both the teachers' birth-place and several school features related
23 We included school random eects to capture general time-invariant retention in each school, which is not due
to observable characteristics.
20to the student mix. Specically, teachers seem to try to avoid schools located in a context with
a high illiteracy rate, a high proportion of people employed in agriculture, and a low occupation
rate. Furthermore, a high share of disabled students, foreign-born students, drop-out students, and
students failing to gain access to the next grade make a school less attractive to teachers. The
centralized allocation system seems unable to equalize opportunities among the dierent school
environments.
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23Table 1: Descriptive statistics on teachers.
All teachers Tenured teachers from at
least two years not made
redundant from the school
Mean SD Mean SD
applic 0.121 0.326
tenure 18.26 8.02
dist 119.5 246.4 98.8 221.0
diprov 0.325 0.469 0.298 0.457
age 47.30 8.57 49.64 7.24
female 0.784 0.411 0.784 0.412
t:N 0.301 0.459 0.308 0.462
t:C 0.155 0.362 0.158 0.365
t:city25 0.137 0.344 0.130 0.337
t:city50 0.311 0.463 0.297 0.457
t:city500 0.132 0.339 0.130 0.336
Obs. 1,349,889 1,065,792
Teachers 719,692 560,158

































Table 3: Sample proportion of dicult schools by geographical area and school type.
disabled students foreign students drop-out students failing students
North Centre South North Centre South North Centre South North Centre South
Prim. 0.025 0.028 0.026 0.104 0.087 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.007
Low-sec. 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.100 0.090 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.031 0.028 0.030
Up-sec. 0.019 0.024 0.021 0.071 0.058 0.009 0.015 0.014 0.029 0.148 0.143 0.153
25Table 4: Correlation matrix between student composition variables and social context variables.
fracdisab fracforeign fracleaving fracfail fracillit emplrate fracagric rooms avHHmembers
fracdisab 1.000
fracforeign 0.091 1.000
fracleaving 0.010 0.022 1.000
fracfail 0.041 -0.007 0.277 1.000
fracillit 0.014 -0.409 0.036 -0.045 1.000
emplrate -0.025 0.542 -0.081 -0.036 -0.695 1.000
fracagric 0.003 -0.181 -0.020 -0.110 0.566 -0.298 1.000
rooms -0.038 0.046 -0.006 -0.020 -0.129 0.117 0.056 1.000
avHHmembers 0.038 -0.344 -0.003 -0.060 0.412 -0.416 0.211 -0.100 1.000
Table 5: Average age of newly-tenured teachers in 2006 by school area and teachers' area of birth.
For each cell we report, in order, average age and the cell sample size.
Teachers' area of birth
School area North Centre South Italy
North 39.0 40.4 38.6 39.0
3,752 174 1,333 5,259
Centre 41.5 40.6 40.5 40.6
87 1,505 572 2,164
South 39.6 39.6 40.5 40.4
92 40 3,129 3,261
Italy 39.1 40.6 40.0 39.7
3,931 1,719 5,034 10,684
26Table 6: Estimated coecients of the probit model for the probability of applying for a transfer (*
signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(dist - 100)/100 0.117** 0.119** 0.120** 0.126**
((dist - 100)/100)
2 -0.056** -0.045** -0.045** -0.047**
((dist - 100)/100)
3 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004**
diprov 0.024** 0.033** 0.032** 0.031**
tenure - 20 -0.034** -0.028** -0.028** -0.027**
(tenure - 20)
2/10 0.004** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
age - 50 -0.031** -0.041** -0.041** -0.041**
(age - 50)
2/10 -0.015** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013**
female -0.141** -0.038** -0.039** -0.036**
t:N -0.327** -0.067** -0.067** -0.065**
t:C -0.182** 0.022* 0.022* 0.023*
t:city25 0.023** 0.022** 0.022** 0.023**
t:city50 0.128** 0.118** 0.118** 0.125**
t:city500 0.016 0.020** 0.021** 0.028**
prim -0.483** -0.483** -0.489**
classic -0.438** -0.437** -0.437**
scient -0.406** -0.406** -0.407**
socscie -0.107** -0.104** -0.105**
tech -0.125** -0.123** -0.122**
prof 0.103** 0.111** 0.113**
art -0.136** -0.135** -0.129**
s:N -0.302** -0.299** -0.309**
s:C -0.229** -0.226** -0.233**
s:city25 -0.016 -0.017 -0.011
s:city50 -0.007 -0.013 0.012
s:city500per -0.002 -0.011 0.006
s:city500centre -0.001 -0.013 0.012
s:highmunic -0.003 -0.001 0.000
(totteachers - 50)/10 -0.031** -0.031** -0.030**
fracnonten 0.000 -0.047 -0.083**
fracage:(.,40) -0.064 -0.076* -0.067
fracage:(41,50) 0.066* 0.059 0.063*
fracage:(61,.) 0.141 0.139 0.121








rooms / 10 0.005**
avHHmembers 0.037*
Constant -1.011** -0.875** -0.861** -0.858**
Obs. 1,065,792 1,065,792 1,065,792 1,065,792
Pseudo R
2 0.097 0.125 0.125 0.126
Log-like. -354,943 -344,123 -344,046 -343,491
27Table 7: Estimated coecients of the probit model for the probability of applying for a transfer by
school type (* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%).
Primary Lower- Upper-
Secondary Secondary
fracdisab 0.330 1.248** 0.797*
fracforeign 0.270** 0.677** 0.626**
fracleaving 0.008 0.514 0.102
fracfail 0.074 0.147 -0.025
fracillit 1.432** 1.951** 2.021**
emplrate -0.627** -1.010** -0.653**
fracagric -0.244* 0.345** 0.237
rooms / 10 0.006** 0.003* 0.005**
avHHmembers -0.034 0.145** 0.066*
Obs. 409,825 277,183 378,784
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.115 0.110
Log-like. -103,782 -106,441 -130,693
Table 8: Estimated coecients of the probit model for the probability of applying for a transfer
with the inclusion of the share of students who have previously repeated one or more years (*












Pseudo R2 0.115 0.111
Log-like. -106,442 -130,669
28Table 9: Estimated coecients of the LLS xed-eects linear probability model for the probability
of applying for a transfer (* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%).
All Primary Lower- Upper-
schools Secondary Secondary
LPM FE LPM LPM FE LPM LPM FE LPM LPM FE LPM
fracdisab 0.193** 0.156** 0.071 0.050 0.317** 0.205** 0.198* 0.046
fracforeign 0.050** 0.013 0.038** 0.032** 0.132** 0.042* 0.098** 0.046**
fracleaving 0.009 0.072** -0.015 0.057 0.188 0.507** 0.046 0.107**
fracfail 0.001 0.037** 0.013 0.009 0.021 0.175** -0.008 0.032**
fracillit 0.475** 0.218** 0.253** 0.028 0.573** 0.458** 0.505** 0.111
emplrate -0.150** -0.169** -0.097** -0.100** -0.225** -0.180** -0.112 -0.163**
fracagric 0.035 0.084** -0.036 0.005 0.094* 0.170** 0.066 0.039
rooms / 10 0.001** 0.000** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001
avHHmembers 0.001 -0.023** -0.006 -0.025** 0.024* -0.017** 0.006 0.009
Constant 0.182** 0.153** 0.118** 0.092** 0.219** 0.165** 0.146** 0.089**
Obs. 1,065,792 1,065,792 409,825 409,825 277,183 277,183 378,784 378,784
Adj. R2 0.092 0.086 0.092 0.081 0.096 0.086 0.085 0.080
 0.027 0.026 0.063 0.058
F test ui = 0 13.7 6.8 8.0 8.1
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A Matching between schools and census divisions
This appendix provides a description of the method used to match schools and census divisions
in order to construct schools' social context variables. The method is essentially based on the
identication of the potential \clients" of each school. For this reason, it is necessary to distin-
guish dierent school types, considering separately primary, lower-secondary and upper-secondary
schools. The procedure for the association between schools and census divisions consists of as-
signing to each school the closest divisions (in terms of geographic distance) so that the relevant
resident population living in those divisions contains at least k > 1 times the number of students
enrolled at that particular school. The relevant population is dened accordingly by school type.
Specically, we refer to the resident population observed in the census age-classes of 5-9 years, 10-
14 years, and 15-19 years, for primary, lower-secondary and upper-secondary schools respectively.
Because lower-secondary schools have a 3-year programme, we correct the relevant population by
multiplying the resident population aged 10-14 years by 3/5. Factor k is a multiplicative factor
(greater than one) which guarantees overlapping of divisions among dierent schools, thus allowing
for some sort of competition among schools which are close to each other. This method allows us to
take into account dierent factors such as geographical distance, the potentially dierent popula-
tion density of each census division, the peculiarity of each school type, and also the attractiveness
of each single school.
Specically, the association procedure consists of the following steps. For each school j
1. identify the type of school (primary, lower-secondary and upper-secondary) and, consequently,
the relevant population in the divisions (population aged 5-9 years, 10-14 years, and 15-19
years respectively)
2. compute the distance between school j and all census divisions
3. census divisions are then sorted by distance (in ascending order)
4. compute the divisions' cumulative relevant population
5. select the rst (closest) Nj divisions so that the cumulative relevant population contains k
times the number of students (Sj) enrolled in school j.
After Nj divisions are associated to each school j according to the procedure described above,
socio-economic variables for each school are obtained as a weighted average of these variables for
the Nj associated divisions, with weights inversely proportional to the distance between the school
and the divisions. The socio-economic context variables used in this paper are obtained by setting
34the multiplicative factor k = 10. Nevertheless, our results are robust to the use of dierent values
of k in the association procedure.
We will now give a brief description of the matching between schools and divisions. First of all,
we do not observe substantial dierences in the distribution of the resident population in the census
age-classes of 5-9 years, 10-14 years, and 15-19 years (which is relevant for primary, lower-secondary
and upper-secondary schools respectively). The average number of in the three age classes is about
8.
On the other hand, we observe substantial dierences in the number of primary, lower-secondary
and upper-secondary schools, as well as in the number of their enrolled students. Specically, we
observe a high number of primary schools (about 17,000) with an average of about 165 enrolled
students. There are about 7,000 lower-secondary schools with an average of about 235 enrolled
students. There are also about 7,000 upper-secondary schools with an average of 379 enrolled
students.
The average distance between matched schools and divisions is lower for primary schools than
for lower-secondary and upper-secondary schools. As we would expect from the higher number,
primary schools are on average closer to census divisions than the lower and upper secondary schools.
Furthermore, as shown by the table below, the number of schools associated to census divisions is
on average close to the multiplicative factor K = 10. No relevant dierences are observed between
geographical areas.
We note that by looking at the number of schools, for each grade, associated to a given census
division we may state whether that census division is better served than others and whether house-
holds living there have more alternatives to choose from. By focusing on broad aggregates, the
following table shows little dierences across the North, the Centre and the South of the country,
while, as expected, primary schools oer a wider set of alternatives than schools at higher levels.
Average number of schools associated to census divisions by area and distance and area
North Centre South Italy
Prim Low-Sec Up-Sec Prim Low-Sec Up-Sec Prim Low-Sec Up-Sec Prim Low-Sec Up-Sec
(0,1] km 1.8 0.9 1.6 2.5 1.1 1.7 3.5 1.5 2.6 2.5 1.1 1.9
(1,5] km 6.1 4.4 4.4 6.0 4.0 4.7 4.0 3.6 3.6 5.5 4.0 4.2
(5,10] km 2.6 3.3 2.0 2.4 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.4 3.0 1.9
>10 km 1.0 2.7 2.1 1.4 3.6 2.7 1.2 2.9 2.1 1.1 3.0 2.2
Tot 11.5 11.2 10.0 12.3 11.7 11.0 10.7 10.5 10.2 11.5 11.1 10.3
The range of alternatives oered to households may be also examined, as in the following table,
by looking at the share of census divisions associated to 1, 2 or more competing schools by area
and school type. If we consider that schools of the same type compete with each other for a share
of pupils, this table oers a simple picture of the Italian school market. The precise gures to
35some extent derive from some arbitrary choices due to the multiplicative factor described above.
However, by comparing dierent areas one can see where the competition among schools is more
or less accentuated.
36Fraction of divisions associated to 1, 2 or more competing schools by area and school type
North Centre South Italy
1 2 3+ 1 2 3+ 1 2 3+ 1 2 3+
prim 0.006 0.003 0.992 0.001 0.004 0.995 0.003 0.006 0.991 0.004 0.004 0.992
lowsec 0.003 0.005 0.992 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.001 0.003 0.996 0.002 0.003 0.995
classic 0.683 0.245 0.072 0.644 0.221 0.134 0.687 0.238 0.075 0.667 0.245 0.088
scient 0.371 0.314 0.315 0.216 0.340 0.444 0.287 0.394 0.319 0.307 0.349 0.344
socscie 0.774 0.183 0.043 0.755 0.190 0.055 0.686 0.270 0.044 0.743 0.212 0.045
tech 0.113 0.180 0.707 0.092 0.196 0.712 0.116 0.201 0.683 0.108 0.189 0.703
prof 0.266 0.289 0.445 0.262 0.344 0.394 0.276 0.324 0.401 0.267 0.309 0.424
art 0.784 0.184 0.031 0.768 0.194 0.037 0.868 0.126 0.006 0.812 0.164 0.023
37B Description of teacher-level variables
Variable Description
applic Indicator for a teacher applying for a transfer
tenure Number of years of tenure
dist Distance (km) between the municipality where the teacher was born and the
municipality where she actually works
diprov Indicator for working in a dierent province from that of birth
age Age
female Indicator for female teachers
t:N Indicator for a teacher born in the North of Italy
t:C Indicator for a teacher born in the Centre of Italy
t:city25 Indicator for a teacher born in a municipality with
between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants
t:city50 Indicator for a teacher born in a municipality with
between 50,000 and 500,000 inhabitants
t:city500 Indicator for a teacher born in a municipality with more than 500,000
inhabitants
38C Description of school-level variables
Variable Description
prim Indicator for primary school
classic Indicator for upper secondary school: classical studies stream
scient Indicator for for upper secondary school: scientic studies stream
socscie Indicator for for upper secondary school: social science studies
tech Indicator for upper secondary school: technical studies
prof Indicator for upper secondary school: professional studies
art Indicator for upper secondary school: artistic stream
s:N Indicator for a school being located in the North of Italy
s:C Indicator for a school being located in the Centre of Italy
s:city25 Indicator for a school located in a municipality between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants
s:city50 Indicator for a school located in a municipality between 50,000 and 500,000 inhabitants
s:city500per Indicator for a school located in the suburb of a municipality with more than
500,000 inhabitants
s:city500centre Indicator for a school located in the centre of a municipality with more than
500,000 inhabitants
s:highmunic Indicator for a school located in a municipality over 600 metres above sea level
totteachers Total number of teachers working in a school
fracnonten Share of non-tenured teachers working in a school
fracage Share of tenured teachers in dierent age groups
expansion Indicator for a school increasing the number of enrolled students (the number of students
in the past year not greater than the number of students in the current year)
fracdisab Share of students with a disability within the school
fracforeign Share of foreign students within the school
fracleaving Share of students in the school who drop out of the school system
fracfail Share of students in the school failing to move up to the next grade
fracdelay Share of students in the rst year at the school having previously
repeated one or more years
fracillit School context's fraction Share of agricultural workers in the school catchment area
emplrate Occupation rate in the school catchment area
fracagric School context's fraction of occupied with agriculture
rooms Number of rooms per household (standardized by household
composition and municipality size) in the school catchment area
avHHmembers Average number of household members in the school catchment area
39D Robustness checks for the model for the probability of applying
for a transfer
Estimated coecients of the school-specic random eect probit model for the probability of applying for
a transfer (* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%). This model allows for school-specic unobserved
heterogeneity by including school random eects in order to capture general time-invariant retention in each
school, which is not due to observable characteristics.
All Primary Lower- Upper-
schools Secondary Secondary
fracdisab 0.826** 0.488* 1.261** 0.737**
fracforeign 0.299** 0.359** 0.432** 0.491**
fracleaving 0.009 -1.305 0.950 0.183
fracfail 0.054 0.103 0.020 0.111*
fracillit 2.195** 1.738** 1.824** 2.247**
emplrate -0.853** -0.605** -1.095** -0.720**
fracagric 0.195** -0.227* 0.502** 0.201
rooms / 10 0.005** 0.005** 0.003 0.005**
avHHmembers 0.016 -0.032 0.112** 0.044
Obs. 1,065,792 409,825 277,183 378,784
Log-like. -336,579 -102,112 -104,102 -128,677
 0.090 0.077 0.102 0.072
LR test  = 0 13,822.7 3,340.0 4,674.7 4,033.7
Estimated coecients of the probit model for the probability of applying for a transfer by gender,
teachers' area of birth and schools' area (* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%).
Gender Teachers' area of birth School area
Men Women North Centre South North Centre South
fracdisab 0.697** 0.773** 0.427 0.458 1.043** 0.436 0.221 1.367**
fracforeign 0.454** 0.304** 0.511** 0.065 0.415** 0.486** 0.156 0.759**
fracleaving -0.118 -0.024 -0.150 0.152 0.047 -0.341 0.238 0.173
fracfail -0.174* 0.081 -0.002 0.238* -0.005 -0.041 0.272* -0.023
fracillit 2.060** 1.982** 4.221** 2.516* 2.276** 2.321 4.167** 2.588**
emplrate -0.741** -0.819** -1.136** -1.249** -0.268* -0.966** -1.193** -0.014
fracagric 0.117 0.132 0.315** 0.606** -0.040 0.421** 0.643** -0.129
rooms / 10 0.005** 0.006** 0.012** 0.004 0.003** 0.013** 0.004 0.001
avHHmembers 0.055* 0.026 0.001 -0.087* 0.092** -0.038 -0.149** 0.123**
Obs. 230,386 835,406 328,478 168,234 569,080 390,415 196,656 478,721
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.136 0.113 0.121 0.127 0.109 0.113 0.133
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